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PART ONE: SEED CAPITAL - WHERE WE ARE AT? 
 
Plus ça Change 
 
“It has been represented to us that great difficulty is experienced by the 
smaller and medium sized businesses in raising the capital which they may 
from time to time require, even when the security is perfectly sound.” 
 
“But many small businesses with high growth potential still find it difficult to access the 
risk capital, and particularly the equity they need to fulfill their ambitions. These lost 
opportunities represent both an economic cost through reduced productivity growth 
and job creation, and a social cost to the communities within which they trade.” 
 
The two above statements could be successive paragraphs in a contemporary report on the 
state of financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 2004. But there is one 
difference- 72 years! The first quotation comes from the former British prime minister, 
Harold MacMillan, reporting the results of a government committee charged to look at the 
parlous state of finances for smaller businesses in the United Kingdom post the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. This 1931 report is still remembered for its coining of the ever-
green term – the Equity Gap - to describe the wholesale unattractiveness of small firms to 
investors regardless of the underlying quality of the enterprise. The second statement is 
from a would-be UK prime minister, Gordon Brown, writing an introduction as the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer to a 2003 HM Treasury report on the equity gap. 
Three Score Years and Ten 
 
For most of the succeeding period of a biblical life-span between Macmillan and Brown, small 
firms have remained in the policy shadow of large business. It was only as a result of 
catalytic research work carried out in the 1970s by David Birch of MIT that the true 
importance of SMEs to a vibrant economy started to be appreciated. Birch showed using US 
data that small businesses were the major engine of an advanced economy’s employment 
growth. Not only did existing and new SMEs buffer the down-sizing effects of large firms but 
they also were the largest contributors to net employment growth. Birch’s work predated the 
small business driven technology revolution which would become synonymous with the 
locations of Palo Alto, Southern California and Route 128 Boston. But by the late 1980s 
virtually every developed economy in the world had started to realize that small businesses 
were not the ‘also ran’, vestigial rump of a mature economy but the bed rock on which a 
large and important part of a nation’s future economic and innovative foundations were 
firmly grounded. Accordingly, the 1990s saw a deluge of reports, initiatives and programs 
which exhorted as diverse groups as school children, large corporations, government 
departments and university professors all to become more entrepreneurial. By the New 
Millenium, Steve Jobs and Richard Branson had become the new Moses indicating, if much of 
the hyperbole was to be believed, a promised land based of unrestrained free market access 
and burgeoning new enterprises. 
 
New business is risky and a majority of start-ups deservedly die within one to three years of 
their birth. But an entrepreneurial society requires investors to take risks in order that the 
stream of spectacular new ideas that will fuel the future reinvigoration of an established 
economy can obtain the critical first pounds (or euros, dollars or yen) on which the nascent 
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enterprise relies. Thus, the renaissance of the importance of SMEs, particularly as a major 
means of ensuring technological innovation, has been intimately associated with the growth 
of venture capital finance, often termed risk capital. The continuing and dominant success of 
the United States economy in the commercialization of new technologies, has become the 
biggest single argument for the value of new venture finance. America’s ability to create 
large numbers of both individual (business angels) and institutional (venture capitalists) 
conduits to invest in high potential but also highly speculative ventures has been one 
defining characteristic isolating the USA from otherwise comparable European economies. 
A European Paradox 
 
Europe has not kept up with the USA as a powerhouse of new technology commercialization. 
For Europe, the problem is simply put. If an investor is to be rational, regardless of whether 
acting as an individual or an institutional investor, he or she would invest in Management 
Buy-Outs and other later-stage Private Equity instruments. The rational investor would 
eschew any invitations to invest in early-stage and particularly new technology investments. 
Over the period since the 1980s that the British Venture Capital Association (the UK is the 
largest venture capital/ private equity industry outside of the US) has been able to collect 
performance figures, early stage investments have see a ‘cash to cash’ Internal Rate of 
Return of 4.7% p.a.. Over the same period, large MBOs have registered a return to investors 
of 16.4% p.a. In the last ten years, the normal cylce of a closed-end fund,  the returns to 
early-stage in the UK has been minus 10.6% compared to larger MBOs plus 17.7%. In the 
US, the results are reversed with early-stage/seed investments providing a far more 
attractive return at 39.8% p.a. than all MBOs at 8.5% p.a. This disparity in comparable 
investment performances, particularly in the domain of early-stage technology enterprises, 
has had inevitable consequences. As one senior UK venture capitalists replied when asked if 
his fund invested in British high-tech start-ups: 
 
“If it has got coloured wires and a plug, we won’t touch it!” 
 
That European investors have followed this trenchant, (albeit jaundiced) advice is 
uncontestable. And the earlier the stage of investment, the greater the disparity between 
supply and demand. The UK industry association does not even attempt to record seed 
capital statistics which have become rounding errors in an aggregation of all stages of 
venture capital and private equity investment. As the UK government’s own statistics show, 
the UK has the worse early-stage/later-stage ratio of risk capital funds available of any major 
economic region in the world. 
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The result of this relative dearth of early-stage equity finance is likely to be a major 
contributor to the widespread policy concern – termed the European paradox -  that 
European scientists may produce world class IP (intellectual property) but the fruits of their 
endeavors are then captured and capitalized by American and Asian businesses who more 
effectively and quickly commercialize innovative opportunities regardless of their origins. A 
modern economy lacks early-stage venture capital and the presence of experienced investors 
able to nurture and grow new technology enterprises at its peril. 
Small is Ugly 
 
In contradiction to the popular catchphrase “small is beautiful”, the patent truth seems to be 
that small is downright ugly when it comes to fund management within venture finance. As 
UK and European funds have increased in size they have abandoned seed and then start-up 
finance. Large funds have migrated to large later-stage deals in Europe. The huge increase in 
funds allocated to venture capital as an alternative asset class has exacerbated this trend. A 
managing partner faced with a fund of half a billion dollars in a closed end fund, a five year 
investment horizon and a requirement for net IRRs to the limited partners in the high 
teens/low twenties, faces some very clear market signals. He or she feels little need or 
obligation to dabble in a sprinkling of 100:1 outsiders needing set-up finance of less than a 
million dollars and a ten year period of grace before any returns are confirmed. As a 
consequence, as the size of the fund under management by venture capital firms increases 
so will the minimum and average amounts invested in first round portfolio companies. 
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This association between fund and deal sizes is in part because of the tyranny of indivisible 
fixed costs. A good investment executive in a competitive professional labor market does not 
cost any less because the finance is to be invested in small rather than large traunches. The 
‘due diligence’ necessary to assess the prospects of a novel technology-based enterprise is 
no less costly if its founders are seeking $500,000 seed funding as apposed to $10 million 
expansion finance. Further, a general partner on a 2% (of total fund value) fee income and a 
carry of 20% of net capital gain has a very clear rationale to go for as large a fund as 
possible. When these structural disincentives to investing small sums of money are aligned 
and compounded with the greater uncertainties and risk of early-stage technology investing, 
there appears an unassailable logic for investors to abandon the types of speculative 
investment opportunities that have lead in the past to VC financed industry revolutions in the 
form of Microsoft, Apple, Cisco, Amgen, eBay etc. 
 
 
 
Tyranny 1:  Sources of Venture Capitalists’ Risk in Seed (Technology) Investment 
 
Source of Risk 
Internal (I) or 
External (E)  
Characteristics of Risk: 
Management Risk I the entrepreneur and management team possess  
insufficient skills to grow the company effectively and profitably 
 
Market Risk E the product/service introduced by the firm is insufficiently  
attractive to the market place to generate the necessary sales  
revenues, the target market is to small, or competitors react  
too vigorously  
 
Technology Risk E the proposed novel technology or its application proves  
unsuccessful by either not working or producing insufficient  
benefits to potential users 
 
Pricing Risk I/E the investor over-estimates the terminal value of the enterprise  
and, thus, under prices the contribution of equity provided 
 
Finance Risk I/E the enterprise does not generate the scale of revenues or  
profits to meet the investment return targets of the investors 
and/or cover debt interest 
 
 
 
Government Policy Responses 
 
The supply of seed capital is universally perceived as problematic. It is, and has remained, 
the venture capital industry’s ‘skeleton in the cupboard’ in all regions outside the USA. 
Government has sought to address these equity gap issues by both supply and demand side 
initiatives. Ironically, the single most common contemporary policy response is to use the 
experience of the US Government’s Small Business Investment Companies program (SBICs) 
to increase incentives to private investors. The logic of these ‘equity enhancement’ schemes 
is that with the state providing subordinated finance to commercially sponsored early-stage 
funds, the positive returns to private investors can be leveraged sufficiently to attract their 
commercial interest and involvement. Typically government funds are invested first and 
repaid last thereby increasing further the leveraged returns to the preferential, private 
investors’ equity contribution. In a smaller number of cases, the private investors are also 
offered guarantees covering part of their equity exposure to the fund. 
PART TWO: TIME FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON SEED CAPITAL? 
 
In order to understand how seed capital really works, it is necessary to explore the character 
and dynamics those funds andto understand the behaviour of investment executives which 
have actually undertaken this challenging investment activity. This empirical observation is 
particularly important as only a minority of VC general partners actually engage in any early-
stage investment activity at all. To this end, the authors engaged on a set of interlinked and 
contiguous research activities. Specifically, the problems were address from three separate 
but related levels of analysis: 
 
Tier 1:  Venture Capital Funds - using secondary data sources from an established 
industry database 
Tier 2:  Top Management Teams in Venture Capital Firms – using empirical observation 
prior to collecting secondary data including archival materials 
Tier 3:   Individual Investment Executives in Venture Capital Firms – using the results 
of findings from an experiment on business school participants 
 
Who Actually Makes Seed Capital Investments, and Does Fund Size Matter? 
 
At the most aggregated level, we explore the actions of venture capital funds that have 
demonstrated a minimum threshold level of interest in seed investments. Our analysis 
reviewed the portfolio compositions of nearly 3,000 funds worldwide between 1962 and 2002 
– a period which represents virtually the totality of VC investment activity to date. We only 
focus on funds that have made at least 10 portfolio investments, thereby reducing the bias 
that may emerge from including less active funds. We have also excluded venture backed, 
internet-based investment from our analysis in order to remove the ‘bubble effect’ of the 
dot.com era. There are two parts to our analysis: i) identifying the factors that distinguish 
the funds that have made seed investment from those that have not; and ii), for those funds 
that have made seed investments, identifying the factors that contribute to a higher intensity 
of such investment. 
 
Our results highlight several important associations and interactions. In particular, the longer 
the VC fund has been in existence, the more prepared its managers are to make seed 
investments. Cumulative experience appears to matter in an activity known for its difficulty. 
The study discovered that some of the largest and most established VC funds, particularly, in 
the US, had also made the most seed investments (see Table 1). This fact is not well known 
with many industry observers believing most seed funds are small specialist entities.  
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However, the relationships between scale and seed activity is not linear. An “inverse U” 
shaped curve exists indicating that, as a fund increases its portfolio numbers, it also invests 
in more seed deal until an inversion point when increased portfolio size becomes associated 
with an overall decline in seed activity. Conversely, the relationship between total invested 
capital and seed activity is a “U” shape. As funds get larger they do less seed deals but this 
relationship changes and the very largest funds are, once again, active seed investors. 
However, given the scale of these very large funds, their seed activity frequently remains 
largely hidden.  
 
These non-linear relationships suggest that there exists both a minimum and maximum scale 
efficiency in making seed investments. Particularly, a fund can be too small (as measured by 
the value of funds under management) for seed activity. Also as a portfolio gets larger in 
number of firms, the level of seed activity increases and then declines with further portfolio 
growth. These finding have significant policy implications for the state as a major funder of 
seed capital.  Our results also highlight the importance of exploration by the fund manager. 
Investors in new technologies need to know what innovations may be imminent - heralding 
both continuous and discontinuous change - from a close observation of research activity. A 
new technology might have enormous effects on society and, as such, present huge 
commercial opportunities provided the investor was closely attuned to and observant of the 
changing technology landscape. Thus, when viewed in this context, our results suggest that 
seed investing may be an important mechanism for investors to stay at the forefront of 
industry developments. In essence, for the larger funds with substantial technology 
interests, seed capital investment may be justified as much as an advanced intelligence 
activity as by any capital gain consequent on the relatively unimportant levels of monies 
invested. 
 
Assessing Deal Flow – What Really Counts? 
 
Talking about the ‘behaviour’ of a fund is to anthropomorphise an intangible object. The fund 
is a legal envelope that defines the rights and responsibilities of a number of investors or 
limited partners regarding the husbandry of a fixed sum of money for investment, and any 
returns flowing from that investment. Funds per se can neither invest nor disinvest. 
Executive decision making, including the crafting of fund strategies and subsequent 
investment allocations or exits, is the responsibility of the professional staff, i.e. the general 
managing partners of the VC firm. In order to gain a deeper understanding as to why 
professional investors who adopt certain strategies may be more or less open to making 
seed investments, we move beyond the fund to also focus on the actions of the top 
management team level of VC firms.  
 
The data for this second study embraced the investment history of 112 US venture capital 
firms over a 6-year period (1996-2002) and included building a detailed account of the prior 
experience (education and industry experience) of the firms' top decision makers. We were 
interested in understanding in detail what type of investments had individual VC firms made, 
and the performance outcomes of these investments. In addition, we sought to distinguish 
between different areas of expertise among general partner investors and their consequent 
effects on the selection and success of their portfolio companies.  
 
We judged the expertise of the management on both specialist and general competencies:  
 
specific human capital or requisite expertise pertained to knowledge and skills related to 
financial risk appraisal and management,  
general human capital pertained to knowledge and skills that are more detached from the 
context of portfolio management.  
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Finally, we examined the degree to which the status and reputation of the VC firm, facilitated 
or deterred its involvement in seed investing. 
 
We found that the type of experience (i.e. human capital) of the top management team 
members affected both the focus of the portfolio in terms of i) the selected development 
stages and ii) the relative success of the portfolio investments. More specifically, we found 
that an executive background in finance-related industries was negatively associated with 
the proportion of early-stage (i.e. including seed) investments accepted by the funds, and 
positively associated with prevention of bankruptcies (rather than with the achievement of 
successful exits) among their portfolio firms.  
 
These results led us to speculate that prior experience mattered in terms of how risky 
investment were perceived, chosen and managed. Thus, although investment analysis and 
selection is popularly conceived as a set of learned skills that are both objective and 
quantitatively verifiable, our results can be seen to challenge this simplified logic. They 
indicate that the VC firms’ senior investment executives are rather less objectively rational 
and rather more subjectively conditioned that would at first be expected. The national VC 
industry associations go to great lengths to publicise the professional and objective nature of 
the decision processes which determine how their members allocate scarce funds to 
excessive numbers of claimants. Industry statistics show that only around one in a hundred 
applicants for risk capital is likely to be successful. Over half of all entrepreneurs seeking 
initial funding from professional venture capitalists are likely to be refused after a cursory 
inspection of their proposal. Venture capitalists’ processes are frequently held up as 
exemplars of professionalism for other groups of investors. In comparison, business angels 
are sometimes criticised for not being so objectively rigorous in their analyses and selection 
processes as formal venture capital firms. Our findings would suggest that venture 
capitalists’ claims to a professional objectivity may be aspirational rather than necessarily 
factual. 
 
In addition to highlighting the importance of the educational and professional backgrounds of 
the managing partners for explaining the intensity of seed investing, we also found that a VC 
firm’s social network position further moderated its pattern of seed investing. We found both 
positive and negative influences at play. On one hand, for high-status firms, executives with 
a finance industry background were even less interested in early-stage businesses. Status 
appears to encourage conservatism. On the other hand, VC firms with strong reputations 
built upon previous successes were sensitised them to take a more risk tolerant approach 
towards accepting early-stage firms. This suggests that two opposing forces may be in play: 
namely, a VC firm’s high social position may restrain its willingness to invest in unproven 
industries or companies, while its past successes (and thus accumulated slack resources) 
may propel it towards experimentation. Essentially, higher fund status and positive 
investment performance experience makes firms become either more focused on or 
minimising risk (the “banker approach”) or maximising success (the “entrepreneur 
approach”), respectively. The funds behaviour to new opportunities is likely to change over 
time depending on previous performance and the general partners’ consequent willingness to 
take risks or play it safe. 
 
This insight from the VC firms’ management teams then served to inform our third study 
which looks at the decision processes of the individual team members. 
 
In the End, It is Individuals that say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 
 
Just as funds are actually managed by investment teams, these teams are similarly 
composed of individual investment professionals. Whether or not an opportunity is 
recognised and enacted initially requires the attention and then the direct engagement and 
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commitment of an analyst. The analyst’s recommendation will subsequently be sanctioned or 
rejected by an investment team or committee in a standardised investment process. Thus, 
the committee’s decision necessarily requires the prologue of individual action. The inter-
relationship between prior experience, risk perception and management action have to be 
measured against the actions and preferences of individual participants. They cannot be fully 
inferred from a group-level study. Accordingly, our third study involves experimental work at 
the individual investment executive level. It elaborates specifically on the key issue of the 
relationship between prior experience (of the investor) and the origination of seed deals.  
 
In particular, we examine the initial screening of potential venture capital deals and relate 
the outcomes to the prior experience of the investor. Our focus on deal screening decisions 
was motivated by the fact that, as noted, over 90% of incoming investment proposals to a 
VC firms are eliminated within a very short time. There is a ‘two tier’ selection process and 
investors do not waste valuable time, experience and the cost of expert opinions on pursuing 
due diligence for all but a minority of deals that are perceived as potentially attractive. We 
suggest that there might be an observable relationship between the characteristics of the 
deals that do make it through the ‘first cut’ and some stable predispositions of the individual 
investor making the selection decision. We start from the assumption that the screening 
decision maker seeks to either maximizing success (upside focus) or minimizing risk 
(downside focus). In order to model individual action more credibly, we include both the 
investor’s technical expertise and learning style as elements to the decision model. 
Underpinning our assumption is a testable hypothesis that previous experience influences 
current actions. 
 
In order to capture the interplay on the selection process between the characteristics of 
potential deals and the influence of investor’s prior knowledge and experience, we conducted 
a specially designed experiment. 93 MBA students, members of the Private Equity Club in a 
major international business school, were invited to respond to three deal scenarios 
representing varying degrees of uncertainty. Our knowledge of the students undertaking the 
experiment allowed us to cross-reference their selection actions with the individuals’ 
preferences and expert knowledge.  
 
The results showed that positively responding to uncertain and risky deals depended on: i) 
the level of deal uncertainty and ii) a particular combination of domain specific knowledge 
and learning style (see Figure 1). In high-uncertainty deals, the effect of domain specific 
knowledge on deal screening is negative regardless of the investor’s learning style, with a 
steeper slope for investors with accommodative learning styles, i.e. focused on success 
maximisation. These findings also suggest that high-uncertainty situations may be quite 
overwhelming with risk concerns becoming paramount. This is consistent with a managerial 
perspective of risk, i.e. stressing the need to avoid losses as well as a risk aversion in the 
domain of gains. Investors bereft of information or relevant personal experience of a new 
enterprise are likely to react negatively. Further, investors with expertise are likely to be 
increasingly negative at both high and low levels of risk. The former is too scary and the 
latter is likely to be unattractive for reasons of insufficient profits. This finding is likely to 
induce a pained response among most entrepreneurs. It appears they are ‘damned if they 
do’ (go for high risk/high reward) and damned if they don’t (go for low risks/low reward). 
 
The entrepreneurial applicant for venture funds certainly cannot predict the learning style or 
domain experience of the person who will appraise his application for funds. Very often, the 
applicant will never meet the person charged with filtering out the unmanageable stream of 
new business proposals that most venture capitalists experience on a daily basis. All the 
applicant can do it to try and pitch his/her ideas to funds which have a clear level of 
experience in the entrepreneur’s chosen enterprise area. It may well be highly desirable to 
use a professional and knowledgeable intermediary to ensure access to appropriate investor 
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firms. Further, funds that have in the past been successful investors are more likely to be 
sympathetic to high risk/high reward ideas if they remain in their field of competence. 
However, such knowledge is not widely available. 
 
Conclusions: Through a Glass very Darkly 
 
In summary, we can observe that increasing fund size is not necessarily a barrier to seed 
capital investment. Our results provide evidence of a minimum scale efficiency. Thus, there 
are strong arguments that governments should redirect their activities to supporting not only 
new specialist early-stage funds but also to encouraging the incremental seed activity of 
large established VC firms. In Europe, such imprecations by government are not likely to be 
universally welcome by larger funds nor their limited partners. While the need for seed funds 
is almost universally accepted by the venture capital community, there is also a consensus 
that someone else should do it. When it comes to seed capital most European investors are 
nimby-s, i.e. not in my back yard. European venture capitalists all to often continue to lack 
the ideological commitment or the skill sets of their more technologically literature US 
cousins. 
 
In order to comprehend the nature of seed investment, and perhaps influence its supply, it is 
evident that the entrepreneurs seeking seed funds must be both pro-active and savvy. They 
need to understand the behaviour and background (education and industry experience) of 
the VC firms’ top management teams. The histories of the team members influence both 
their preferences and their investment behaviour. Investors’ experience also influences the 
degree to which they can affect the successful outcomes of the enterprises into which they 
have committed equity finance (Barry 1994). Given the two prevailing strategies of 
maximising success or minimising failures, the investors in VC funds faces a dilemma. 
Investment executives from a finance industry background prefer to avoid risky, seed stage 
investments. They have neither the industry skills nor the aptitude for such an investment 
activity. These investors are not likely to be the initial sponsors or backers of the next 
generation of global winners comparable to Microsoft, Cisco or Amgen. However, just as they 
are less likely to see very successful investment exits, they are also less likely to have their 
portfolio companies go bankrupt. Poorly informed on technology and cautious, these 
archetype financiers fulfil every prejudice of the technology community! 
 
Our results also show that two personal experience factors, i.e. specific human capital and 
learning style, are crucial for effectively responding to potential deals containing a high 
degree of uncertainty. These insights may help in the design of effective seed capital 
investment activities. For the state to intervene effectively in supporting the initial financing 
of early-stage firms, it may need to allocate as much resource to deepening the human 
capital of the early-stage investment community as to providing a large part of the total 
funds which are hazarded on new enterprises. Seed capital is a peculiarly challenging 
investment activity. And governments who see knowledge as a critical strategic asset of a 
modern economy will similarly have little choice but to continue to find means for its 
encouragement. We can offer no easy solutions. Seed capital is, and will remain in the 
foreseeable future, a hard and stony road to travel for both investors and governments alike. 
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Table 1 Twenty-five Most Active VC Firms Investing in Seed Capital 1962-2002 
 
Name of 
VC Firm 
No. Seed 
Investme
nts 
No. 
Portfolio 
Companie
s 
%Seed in 
Portfolio 
 Invested 
Capital 
($000)  
Nationalit
y VC Firm 
Year 
Founded 
Crosspoint 
Venture 
Partners 109 233 46.8% 
                        
1,575,698  
United 
States 1978 
New 
Enterprise 
Associates 104 662 15.7% 
                        
4,009,177  
United 
States 1975 
Kleiner 
Perkins 
Caufield & 
Byers 100 488 20.5% 
                        
2,732,371  
United 
States 1973 
Mayfield 
Fund 74 433 17.1% 
                        
2,220,803  
United 
States 1970 
J.P. 
Morgan 
Partners 
(FKA: 
Chase 
Capital 
Partners) 72 1352 5.3% 
                        
8,685,709  
United 
States 1967 
Sequoia 
Capital 50 469 10.7% 
                        
2,160,099  
United 
States 1975 
U.S. 
Venture 
Partners 49 322 15.2% 
                        
1,747,813  
United 
States 1980 
Domain 
Associates, 
L.L.C. 46 175 26.3% 
                          
902,362  
United 
States 1981 
Institution
al Venture 
Partners 45 304 14.8% 
                        
1,592,411  
United 
States 1960 
Ben 
Franklin 
Technolog
y Partners, 
The 41 70 58.6% 
                            
21,963  
United 
States 1995 
Draper 
Fisher 
Jurvetson 
(FKA: 
Draper 
Associates
) 38 191 19.9% 
                          
833,224  
United 
States 1983 
Oak 
Investmen
t Partners 38 403 9.4% 
                        
2,944,157  
United 
States 1960 
Mohr 36 168 21.4%                        United 1983 
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Davidow 
Ventures 
818,542  States 
St. Paul 
Venture 
Capital, 
Inc. 36 209 17.2% 
                        
1,009,378  
United 
States 1988 
Sevin 
Rosen 
Funds 
(AKA: 
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